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Abstract
Although the initial allocation of pollution permit s is neutral in terms of efficiency, it 
does have a significant impact on distributive equi ty. In this paper, we examine the two 
main categories of permit allocation rules, the dis tributive and the reductive, for con-
trolling phosphorus pollution in a small catchment  in South West England. Based on the 
premise that the regulatory choice compromises effi ciency and equity, the main result of 
this paper is that an allocation of permits in prop ortion to the intensity of environmental 
preferences is a “win-win” choice. The reason is th at it simultaneously achieves two 
goals.  First,  it  is  efficient  (or  cost-effective)  s ince  a  permit  system  achieves  a  pre-
specified target at a minimum abatement cost, while second, it is t he only allocation 
rule which reduces the income inequality of the baseline sce nario. 
Keywords:  pollution  permits,  phosphorus,  nutrient  management,   export  coefficient 
model, water quality, distributive justice, income  inequality, Atkinson In-
dex
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Introduction. 
Transferable pollution permits (TPP henceforth) see m to attract considerable atten-
tion  among  OECD  countries  for  environmental  and  res ource  management  (OECD, 
2001). TPP refer to physical restrictions in the fo rm of rights or obligations to agents 
and the permission to transfer these obligations or rights between  agents under certain 
conditions  specified  by  an  administrative  authority .  This  approach  allows  agents  to 
choose the cost effective means of meeting the over all constraint set by the regulatory 
authority.
Montgomery (1972) proves that under specific assump tions, TPP are a cost-effective 
means for achieving a pre-specified target of envir onmental quality. These assumptions 
refer to perfect competitive product and permit mar kets, to clearly defined property and 
usage rights, and to negligible transaction costs.  Furthermore, the least-cost property of 
such instruments is based on the premise that emiss ion trading occurs simultaneously 
and multilaterally, while in most cases the realise d emission trading has been bilateral 
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and sequential. The latter is often considered as t he most likely explanation why emis-
sion trading does not realise the full efficiency g ains in controlling pollution (Atkinson 
and Tietenberg, 1991).
In the case of agricultural pollution, farmers can  modify the distribution of polluting 
rights, initially allocated to them, by permit trad ing. The typical prerequisite for farmers 
to initiate permit trading is the abatement cost he terogeneity. For example, a low abate-
ment cost farm may choose to abate more and sell so me of its permits, while a high 
abatement cost farm may prefer to buy more permits  and maintain its emission levels. 
The interaction of farmers’ willingness to sell and willingness to buy emission perm its 
determines a benchmark price, which is the market price for permits. This price is ind e-
pendent of the initial allocation of permits (OECD, 2001).  
The major issue in designing an emission permit sys tem is whether permits should be 
auctioned or should be freely distributed. There ar e strong arguments in favour of each 
distribution option. The authors advocating auction  as the most appropriate means of 
distributing pollution permits primarily stress the  importance of revenue recycling usu-
ally referred to as the “double dividend hypothesis ”. Under this hypothesis, the govern-
ment revenues from permit auctions can be used to r educe pre-existing distortionary 
taxes and therefore result in efficiency gains to t he economy as a whole (Crampton and 
Kerr, 1998).
In contrast, the traditional view in favour of gran dfathering is that it provides greater 
political control over the distributional effects o f pollution regulation (Stavins, 1997) 
The distributional impacts of tradable permits are  quite crucial for the acceptability of 
such a policy by the agents (Dinar and Howitt, 1997 ). The reason is that only a permit 
system that allocates pollution rights free of char ge, on the basis of some allocation rule, 
would guarantee that existing firms would be no wor se off than they would be under a 
command-and-control system imposing the same degree of con trol (Tietenberg, 1998).
Although the possibility of using TPP for managing water quality at a watershed 
scale has been outlined before (see Tietenberg ( 20 03) and Zylicz ( 2003)), there have 
only been limited applications in the relevant lite rature. Some recent exceptions are Tao 
et al  (2000) and Kampas and White (2003). This paper bri ngs two innovations to the 
analysis of permit allocations. First, it examines  a much broader range of permit alloca-
tion rules which, to our best knowledge, have not been consid ered before at a river basin 
scale. Some of these rules are drawn from the relat ed literature of greenhouse gasses 
control while some others have not been applied bef ore. The second innovation of this 
study is that it assesses the distributional impact s of various permits allocation rules not 
only as transfers between agents- as it is standard  in the relevant literature (Rose and 
Oladosu. 2002)- but also as to whether they alleviate inc ome inequality.  
The empirical application of this study uses the ca se of phosphorus (P henceforth) 
management at a small agricultural catchment in Nor th England, the Kennet. P is usu-
ally the limiting nutrient for the formation of alg al blooms in freshwater bodies. The 
greatest  losses  of  P  from  the  soil  usually  occur  by   surface  run-off  and  erosion 
(Addiscott and Thomas, 2000).  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Sect ion 2 presents a possible range of 
permit allocation rules that could be applied for p hosphorus management. Section 3 
briefly describes the empirical application, while  section 4 presents the results of our 
analysis. Finally, the main conclusions are drawn in se ction 5. 2006, Vol 7, No 2  77
Possible Permit Allocation Rules  
Following Gupta and Bhandari (1999) there are two m ain principles for allocating 
freely emission permits: a) the distributive one, w hich refers to the allocation of rights 
and b) the reductive one, which refers to allocatio n of emission reductions. This section 
outlines the major representative allocation rules  from both principles.  
Although  an  infinitive  number  of  possible  distribut ive  rules  exist,  the  so-called 
grandfathering rules tend to predominate (Tietenberg, 2003). Grandfathering refers to 
the initial allocation of emission on the basis of  historic use. The most common grand-
fathering rule is the emission based, which is an a llocation in proportion to the unre-
stricted level of emission released by the sectors  in the base year,  i
i
e   . On this basis, 
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E e e $ # % &      and  $  denotes the propor-
tion of the required reduction in the unrestricted  level of estimated P-load at the catch-
ment scale. The emission-based allocation is the mos t frequently considered rule for 
distributing emission permits (see Hanley and Moffa tt (1993) Rose and Stevens (1993) 
and Kampas and White (2003)).  
Another grandfathering rule is the profit-based all ocation, which is an allocation in 
proportion to the historical share of sector profit s in the base year. On this basis, any 










 and  i (  is the initial profit of the 
ith  sector. This allocation method is considered by Bo hm and Larsen (1994) and by 
Kverndokk (1995).
The third grandfathering rule utilises a composite index for the initial d istribution of 
emission permits. Such a composite index is defined  as the weighted average of the 
emission shares, profits shares and land shares of  the agents. On this basis, any sector  i












     
, and  i b  is the util-
ised  land  of  the  ith   agent.  Note  that  1 i
i
w #   .  Such  an  allocation  is  proposed  by 
Ringius et al  (1998), Simonis (2000) and Bohringer and Lange (2005) . 
The fourth scheme allocates the emission permits in  proportion to the relative prefer-
ences for environmental quality which society attac hes to various productive sectors. 
Such preferences are defined by society’s willingne ss to pay for an improvement in en-
vironmental quality. Chander and Tulkens (1992) hav e shown that at equilibrium the 
sector marginal costs of reducing their emissions a re equal to the society’s preferences 
for environmental quality towards them. Consequentl y, any sector  i  will initially re-









 and  i m  denoting the marginal cost 
of reducing the emissions of sector  ith .78 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS REVIEW 
The fifth distributive rule allocates the number of  permits in proportion to the sec-
tors’ ability to pay. Under this scheme, the permit s are distributed inversely to the sec-
tor’s income. The rationale behind such a scheme is  that the more profitable sectors 
should shoulder a higher proportion of the mitigati on costs. Therefore, any sector  i  will 













.  The  “ability  to  pay” 
scheme is considered by Rose and Zhang (2004), Ring ius  et al  (1998) and Ridgley 
(1996).
The last scheme considered in this study belongs to  the class of allocation rules 
which refer to emission reductions. It starts with  a uniform emission reduction and then 
adjusts them on the basis of an “Efficiency Index”, i EI . Such index is defined as the 
emission intensity of a sector (P load divided by i ncome), normalised by the total emis-











   
.  Therefore,  any  sector  i   will  initially  receive 
! " 1 i i EI e $ %  amount of permits. The rationale behind such a sch eme is that sectors with 
high emission intensity,  1 i EI - , are requested to abate more compared to the refer ence 
point of uniform reduction in all sectors. Note tha t the resulting allocation from such a 
scheme may need an appropriate scale-up to exhaust  the prescribed number of emission 
rights. Gupta and Bhandari (1999) examine such a scheme.  
As long as the initial allocation of permits is res olved, then each agent maximises the 
following profit function: 
! " ! " 1 max , i i i i i q e p e e ( % %   (1) 
where ! " , i i i q e (  stands for the profit of the  ith  sector,  i q  is a vector of homogeneous 
products  produced  by  the  ith   sector.  The  permit  price  is 1 p   which  is  the  imputed 
shadow price of the constraint  i
i
e E #   , where  ! " i i e e %  stands for the difference be-
tween the emission level released by the  ith  sector,  i e , and the initial allocated permits, 
i e . Note that such a difference can be positive, nega tive, or even zero depending on the 
amount and the direction of permit trading. 
The initial allocation of permits directly determin es an income effect, since it in-
volves a transfer of revenues between agents (direc tly between the State and the agents 
and indirectly between the agents). In turn, these  transfers affect the income distribution 
of the agents. Consequently, the regulator may opt f or a specific allocation that satisfies 
additional policy objectives. Such an additional ob jective may be the alleviation of in-
come inequality. Policies such as the redistributio n of income aim primarily at "socio-
economic" equity and are among the main objectives  of any tax system (Breton  et al ,
1996). Notwithstanding the reduction of income inequality is often conceived as an end 
in itself, the end may require justification. Argua bly, such a justification may be based 
on the premise that "socio-economic" equity plays a n important role in sustaining the 
social fabric, which is well acknowledged by the proponent s of the welfare state (Roller, 
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In what follows, we assume that the regulator pursu es a variety of objectives, one of 
which may be the alleviation of income inequality.  Such an objective can be the guiding 
principle with which the regulator can choose among  various allocation rules. Among 
various indices of income inequality we restrict our attention to the Atki nson Index, 
since it is the only measure which satisfies the Pi gou-Dalton condition (Temkin, 1993)
1 ,
and at the same time can be interpreted as an index of the potential gains  from redistri-
bution (Barr, 1998). 
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where, i I  stands for the income of the  ith  sector,  /  is the average income and  n  is the 
number of sectors. The parameter 0 . -  represents the weight attached by society to 
inequality in the income distribution. The higher t he parameter  .  is the higher the sen-
sitivity attached to the transfers to the lower inco me classes. The index  A  ranges zero to 




% % . According to Atkinson (1975) the index A has a ve ry natural interpretation 
being "…  the proportion of the present total income that wou ld be required to achieve 
the same level of social welfare as if present inco mes were equally distributed …" (p. 
48).
The index A explicitly introduces such judgements t hrough the choice of the parame-
ter . , which ranges from  0 . #  meaning that society is indifferent about income distri-
bution, to  . #7, which means that society is concerned only with t he position of the 
least advantaged members of society. The latter cas e corresponds to what Rawls (1971) 
refers to as a contractual theory of justice, where  inequality is assessed in terms of the 
position of the last advantaged members of society.  Despite the numerous advantages of 
the A index (see Temkin (1993) pp:137-138) the main  problem attached to it is that 
there is no way of fully calibrating  . . As a result someone is restricted to examine pa-
rametrically a range of values in estimating the At kinson’s index. Note that when  1 . #















5 6 8  (Yfantopoylos, 1990). 
The Application of Phosphorus Pollution Management at a River Basin Scale 
For the purposes of examining the distributional im pacts of various permit allocation 
rules and the likely regulatory choice we consider t he hypothetical case of emission 
permits allocation in an agricultural catchment in  South England. In that catchment, the 
Kennet, the regulator considers the case of a cap a nd trade scheme in order to achieve a 
20% reduction in the P emission level relative to the unr egulated case. 
The empirical model proceeded in three stages. Firs t, a Geographical Information 
System (GIS) was used to classify land classes base d on their soil properties and to 
identify the total area of the catchment. Second, a n export coefficient model assessed 80 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS REVIEW 
the P loss possibilities. Finally, an aggregate non -linear programming model simulated 
producers’ responses to the pollution control polic y. Our approach is what Hazell and 
Norton (1986) refer to as an aggregate regional mod el, in which the regulatory objective 
is to maximise regional welfare. The full account o f the modelling framework is given 
by Kampas  et al  (2002).
P is strongly retained in most soils and P losses a re primarily associated with sedi-
ment  carried  in  surface  runoff  during  heavy  rainfall  (Haycock  and  Muscutt,  1995). 
However, quantification of losses are less well understood and advanced for P com-
pared to nitrates (Edwards and Withers, 1998). Ther e is considerable uncertainty with 
respect to the weighting that can be placed upon cr op/agronomic practices against those 
landscape type features that influence loss (such a s slope and soil texture). Within this 
paper we have taken the simplest method of predicti ng P loss – the export coefficient. In 
the form used here the export coefficient model ignores the h ighly episodic and spatially 
discrete nature of many erosion events and although  these weaknesses are acknowl-
edged it still probably represents the most appropr iate assessment. Since P losses are 
likely to be linked with the catchment’s cropping pattern and land mana gement rather 
than the intensity of the inputs used, an export co efficient model is well suited to cap-
ture such a phenomenon. 
Export coefficient models have been used extensivel y in the literature for environ-
mental management analysis (Jones, 1996; Worral and  Burt, 1999; Heathwaite,  et al
2003). It is noteworthy that an export coefficient  model gives estimates of the average 
annual P losses of different land classes ignoring their seasonal va riation, which may be 
quite important (McDowell and Trudgill, 2000). On t he other hand, export coefficient 
models are transparent and easy to implement. An ex port coefficient model can be writ-
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where
P L is the P loss;  i E  is export coefficient for nutrient source  i ; i A  is the area of 
the catchment occupied by land use type  i (or number of livestock type  i ). For the pur-
poses of our application we employed Jones’ (1996)  values for P export coefficients. 
The author empirically validated the P export coeff icient models for two catchments in 
South England, which are adjacent to our case study, and therefore it was assum ed that 
the Kennet catchment has the same pattern of export coeffici ents.  
The following steps were followed to examine the likely regulatory preference for a 
specific permit allocation rule. First, we ran the  unrestricted regional model to assess the 
baseline economic and environmental performance of  the Kennet catchment. Then, we 
ran the restricted regional model to estimate the ‘ first best’ solution for the particular 
regulatory objective examined, that of 20% reductio n in the level of P emissions. The 
first best solution is characterised by the equimar ginal principle, meaning that under 
such a solution the marginal cost of pollution cont rol are the same for all sectors. The 
first best solution can be achieved either through emission taxes or throug h a scheme of 
permits trading. Note that the price for a unit of  emission permit is given by the shadow 
price of the relevant environmental constraint (Hanley  et al ,1997). Table 1 gives the 
main results of the unrestricted (baseline) and the  restricted solutions. 
The choice of a permit allocation scheme is efficie nt neutral in the sense that the re-
gional welfare is not affected, given that all allo cation schemes redistribute the same 2006, Vol 7, No 2  81
amount of permits. By contrast, a particular choice  of a permit distribution rule affects 
the income distribution. Therefore, it was assumed  that a social planner may opt for a 
specific allocation rule which achieves a secondary  regulatory objective such as the re-
ducing income inequality. To this end, the Atkinson  index was estimated for the range 
of allocation rules examined in this study. The nex t section discusses the results derived 
from our regional model decomposed into the involve d agricultural sectors, namely the 
arable and the livestock farming systems. The focus  of permit trading between produc-
tive sectors is typical practise in the relevant li terature (see (Harrison and Radov, 2002) 
), which is directly analogous to what Computable G eneral Equilibrium (CGE) models 
do, in the sense that the results are often decompo sed into countries or block of coun-
tries.
Table 1.  Farm Adjustment and Land Use Changes induced by Pol lution Control.  





Land Use (000’s ha) 
Arable  4.154  3.27 -21.28
Permanent Grassland  1.678  1.678  -
Temporary Grassland  1.505  1.053  -30.03 
Rough Grazing  0.58  0.58  -
Total Grassland   3.763  3.311  -12.01 
Set-aside 1.336 
Total Land  7.917  7.917 
Livestock Grazing Units (000’s GLU) 
Cattle  4.875  4.111 -15.67
Sheep  1.16  1.16 -
Total 6.035  5.271  -12.66 
Phosphorus Load (tons) 
Arable  2.776  2.174  -21.69
Livestock  1.746  1.444  -17.30
Total  4.522  3.618  -20
Profits (000’s £) 
Arable  3976.889  3215.025  -19.16
Livestock  4995.835  4261.227  -14.70
Total  8972.724  7476.252  -16.68
Results and Discussion 
The  regulator  objective  of  a  20%  reduction  in  the  estimated  emission  level  at  a 
catchment scale is equivalent to issuing domestic t ransferable permits equal to the 80% 
of the unrestricted solution. The various permit allocation rules proposed by  the regula-
tor have distinct impact on agents’ profits as pred icted from equation (1). Table 2 shows 
the different permit allocation schemes used in thi s study and the resulting emissions 
permits held by the agricultural sectors in the region. 
From Table 2 it is possible to characterise the var ious allocation rules on the basis of 
sectors’ preferences. The arable sector, for exampl e, prefers the allocation which is pro-82 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS REVIEW 
portional to the intensity of environmental preferences, followed by the grandfathering 
rule on the basis of the P-load shares. In particul ar, the arable sector is allocated more 
permits under the rule which is proportional to the  intensity of environmental prefer-
ences since it is found to have a substantial highe r marginal abatement costs than live-
stock. In addition, the second-best preference for  the arable sector is the grandfathering 
rule on the basis of historic emissions given that  it has a sizeable contribution to the 
overall P-load. All the rest of the allocation meth ods favour the livestock sector, since 
livestock is less polluting and more profitable in compar ison to the arable sector.  
Table 2.  Permits allocation induced by various permit alloca tion rules (tons of P) 
Arable Livestock
Permit Allocation Rules 
Permits  % 9 Permits  % 9
1. Grandfathering         
1.1. Proportional to the baseline P-load share  2.22 1  2.16  1.397  -3.25 
1.2. Proportional to the baseline income share  1.60 3  -26.26  2.014  39.47 
1.3. Proportional to a compromise index  1.907  -12.2 8  1.710  18.42 
2. Proportional to the intensity of environmental 
preferences  2.551  17.34  1.067  -26.11
3. Proportional to the ability to pay   2.014  -7.36  1.603  11.01 
4. Proportional to an efficiency index  2.068  -4.88  1.550  7.34 
5. First Best Solution  2.174    1.444   
Given that the initial distribution has an income e ffect, it follows that the impact of 
various permit allocation methods on sectors’ profi tability should be examined. This is 
presented in the following Table.
Table 3.  Income by Sector resulting from various permit alloc ation rules (000’s of £) 
Arable Livestock
Permit Allocation Rules 
Permits  % 9 Permits  % 9
1.  Grandfathering         
1.1. Proportional to the baseline P-load share  3300 .6  2.66  4175.6  -2.01 
1.2. Proportional to the baseline income share  2179 .7  -32.20  5296.5  24.30 
1.3. Proportional to a compromise index  2731.8  -15. 03  4744.5  11.34 
2.  Proportional to the intensity of environ-
mental preferences  3899.4 21.29  3576.9  -16.06
3.  Proportional to the ability to pay   2925.9  -8.99   4550.4  6.79 
4.  Proportional to an efficiency index  3023.3  -5.96   4453.0  4.50 
5.  First Best Solution  3215.0    4261.2 
It is clear that the pattern of income effects follo ws directly the pattern of the initial 
distribution of emission permits. In particular, th e arable sector has a strong preference 
for the allocation which is proportional to the int ensity of environmental preferences 
because such an allocation brings about a 21.29 % i ncrease in the sector’s income com-
pared to the first best solution. By contrast, the  livestock sector prefers an allocation of 
permits in proportion to the income shares since un der such a scheme the sector’s in-
come is 24.30 % higher than the reference one. Table  4 presents the estimated inequality 
indices for the likely allocation rules. 2006, Vol 7, No 2  83
According to Atkinson (1975) there are two ways of  interpreting the A index. For 
example, the value  0.00081 A #  in Table 4, regarding the baseline scenario under  the 
assumption that  0.5 . # , means that we could reach the same level of socia l welfare, if 
incomes were equally distributed, with only 99.92 %  (1-0.00081=0.9992) of the present 
total income. Alternatively, the gain from redistri bution to bring about equality would 
be equivalent to raising total income by 0.081 per  cent. Admittedly, income inequality 
is not much of a problem for our case study since t he estimated A indices in Table 4 
reflect a rather equal distribution of income between t he agents in the regional economy. 
In addition, as it was expected, the magnitude of t he reduction in income inequality is 
conditional to the choice of the Atkinson Index, .  . In particular, the higher the social 
aversion towards inequality is the higher the welfar e gains from redistribution.  
Table 4.  The Atkinson Index under various permit allocation  rules 
Atkinson Index
Permit Allocation Rules 0.5 . # % 9 1 . # % 9 3 . # % 9
1. Grandfathering             
1.1. Proportional to the baseline P-load share  0.00 086 6.11 0.0069 6.11 0.07908  5.85
1.2. Proportional to the baseline income share 0.011 58 1328.52 0.0910 1305.60 0.66182 785.86
1.3. Proportional to a compromise index  0.00465 473. 29 0.0369 470.00 0.35655 377.24
2. Proportional to the intensity of environ-
mental preferences  0.00012 -85.65 0.0009 -85.63 0.0111 0 -85.14
3. Proportional to the ability to pay   0.00300 270.0 8 0.0239 268.86 0.24854 232.67
4. Proportional to an efficiency index  0.00232 185.5 7 0.0185 184.93 0.19817 165.26
First Best Solution  0.00123 52.00 0.0098 51.91 0.11121   48.85
Baseline Scenario (unrestricted)  0.00081 0.0065  0.07471 
Arguably, what really matters is the relative ranki ng of the likely allocations rules in 
terms of their impact on income inequality, so ther e are a few points that do deserve 
attention. First, the most interesting result is th at the only permit allocation method 
which alleviates income inequality is the one which  is proportional to the intensity of 
environmental preferences. Note that the reference  point for such a comparison is the 
unrestricted solution. All the other rules increase  income inequality. Second, the first 
best solution achieved by permits trading represent s a solution which increases income 
inequality. Third, the most known method of allocat ing emission permits, that of grand-
fathering on the basis of baseline emissions only m arginally worsens income inequality. 
To recapitulate, the permit allocation method which  is proportional to the intensity of 
environmental  preferences  is  among  the  rare  situati ons  termed  “win-win”  solutions 
since it achieves two goals simultaneously. The fir st goal refers to efficiency (or cost-
effectiveness)  since  a  permit  system  achieves  pre-s pecified  targets  at  a  minimum 
abatement cost, while the second refers to equality  since the allocation rule on the basis 
of environmental preferences reduces the income inequalit y of the baseline scenario.  
Conclusions
In this paper we have examined a range of permit al location schemes for the case of 
phosphorus management in a small catchment in South  England. Although the choice of 
an allocation rule is neutral in terms of efficienc y it has an income effect. Assuming that 84 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS REVIEW 
in most cases the regulator seeks a number of objec tives, one of which may be the re-
duction of income inequality, the choice of a permi t allocation scheme comes naturally 
as the one that achieves the lower income inequalit y. On the basis of this paper’s simu-
lated results we have found that the allocation whi ch is proportional to the intensity of 
environmental preferences reduces the initial incom e inequality between the agricultural 
sectors in the region in question. Finally, it should be str essed that although such a result 
may be conditional to the prevailing situations at  the particular region in question (site–
specific), the identified option of a “win-win” pol icy outcome is very promising and 
needs to be confirmed by similar studies before it is established as such. 
Note
1 The Pigou-Dalton condition says that, other things  equal, transfers from rich to poor 
decrease inequality and vice versa (quoted by Sen (1976 ) p.27) 
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